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Appealing to self-interest is a common way of justifying the rationality of 
religious faith. For instance, Pascal’s wager relies upon the expected value of 
choosing the life of faith being infinite. Similarly, many contemporary argu-
ments for the rationality of faith turn on whether it is better for an agent to 
have faith rather than lack it. In this paper, I argue, contra Pascal, that consid-
erations of self-interest do not make choosing faith rational because they fail 
to take into account the way the self is transformed by faith.
Introduction
Imagine Blaise, who is approached by a powerful deity who makes him 
the following offer:
I can make you, Blaise, the happiest man in the world. In fact, I can 
guarantee that your happiness will be unsurpassable. The catch is that 
you will become radically different from who you are now. Your life 
goals, core preferences, and the way you see the world will be different. 
But rest assured, once you change, you won’t mind parting with all the 
things with which you most strongly, currently identify. Becoming the 
happiest man in the world will radically transform you.
From the standpoint of self-interest, is it rational for Blaise to prefer that 
the deity transform him?
Pascal famously held that accepting an analogous offer is rationally 
required. One ought to wager on God, he argued, because the expected 
value of the wager, for the wagerer, is infinite. Though convincing oneself 
to believe in God might involve radical change to one’s life, it is ultimately 
in one’s self-interest to (attempt to) believe because the expected value of 
doing so is greater than the expected value of the alternative. For Pascal, 
adopting a standard decision procedure—one that takes into account the 
values of outcomes and likelihood of those outcomes in calculating ex-
pected values1—fully explains the rationality of faith, at least practically 
1I take “standard decision procedures” to include procedures such as “maximize expected 
value,” dominance, and Rawl’s maximin. I also take it that maximizing expected value is 
the most common of these procedures, and is the one that is most relevant to the Pascalian 




speaking.2 For ease of reference, let’s call this strategy that makes an act 
or preference practically rational in virtue of self-interested value the 
“Pascalian model.” Like Pascal, contemporary thinkers like Buchak3 and 
McKaughan4 have argued that faith is practically rational. Though their 
accounts don’t adopt a purely Pascalian model, they are closely related 
insofar as they incorporate value and practical rationality (and ultimately, 
I’ll have something to say about these accounts, too).
My target in this paper is the Pascalian model—at least as it applies to 
adopting a life of faith. The core of my argument centers upon whether 
the link between self-interested value and rational preference holds when 
agents are confronting decisions involving outcomes in which they will 
undergo radical changes to their core preferences, life goals, and way they 
experience the world. These outcomes involve what I call self-transformation, 
and I begin by unpacking exactly what self-transformation is (§ 1). I then 
introduce a case about past preferences in which it appears, somewhat 
paradoxically, that it’s rational for an agent to prefer an outcome in which 
the agent experiences less value than the agent would in an alternative out-
come (§ 2). I then consider various diagnoses of the case in § 2, ultimately 
favoring one that makes use of the concept of self-transformation (§ 3). On 
this diagnosis, the Pascalian model is viable only if modified to account for 
self-transformation. But once modified, it does not require agents to prefer 
outcomes involving self-transformation. Next, I extend what I say about 
preferences about the past to preferences about the future (§ 4). From here, 
I return to the case of religious faith and suggest that choosing to adopt 
the life of faith is an instance of choosing to undergo self-transformation. 
If the Pascalian model does not require preferring outcomes involving 
self-transformation, then, a fortiori, it doesn’t rationally require agents to 
prefer adopting a life of faith (§ 5). This consequence has interesting impli-
cations, which I highlight in the final section of this paper (§ 6).
Before getting underway, a few preliminaries are in order. First, this 
paper is concerned with practical rationality and self-interest. This con-
cern is in keeping with the accounts of Pascal and others who raise the 
question of whether adopting the life of faith is practically rational. For 
Pascal, it appears that considerations of self-interest determine whether 
an agent’s choice is practically rational. I’m not going to argue for this 
particular interpretation of Pascal (though I think it’s correct), and I’m just 
view, which this paper discusses. I’ll thus proceed with maximizing expected value in mind, 
though what I say applies to the other views as well. (As we’ll see, I challenge whether the 
values in question connect with the self-interest of the deliberating agent, and this point 
applies to the other standard decision procedures.)
2There is some debate about whether value considerations might also make such belief 
epistemically rational. This paper takes no position on that debate. It is concerned only with 
practical rationality. 
3E.g., Buchak, “Can it Be Rational to Have Faith?” and “Faith and Steadfastness.”
4E.g., McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk” and “Action-Centered 
Faith, Doubt, and Rationality.”
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stipulating that the Pascalian model takes considerations of self-interest 
to be sufficient for determining whether a choice or preference is prac-
tically rational. (So if this paper is successful, it shows that self-interest 
doesn’t require agents to prefer the life of faith.) There’s an open general 
question about whether other considerations (such as moral ones) factor 
into practical rationality. My argument is silent about the scenario where 
morality factors into practical rationality and makes it the case that agents 
are rationally required to prefer a life of faith.
Relatedly, this paper is silent on whether it is epistemically rational 
for agents to adopt the life of faith. Indeed, one major upshot of focusing 
on practical rationality is that agents can engage in practical reasoning 
regardless of their other background commitments. This is especially ad-
vantageous in the religious context where theists and non-theists often have 
such intractable differences in these background commitments, such as 
the commitment to God’s existence. As Pascal noted, focusing on practical 
rationality allows one to sidestep this issue since epistemic uncertainty is 
typically accounted for (e.g., Pascal’s wager only requires assigning a non-
zero probability to God’s existence). Thus, the Pascalian model (and my 
critique of it) has broad appeal and applies to theists and non-theists alike.
Second, this paper, especially § 3, discusses rational preferences. It 
does so in part because some of the examples considered in this paper 
involve outcomes that are not strictly speaking live—the agent comparing 
outcomes may not be able to choose a particular outcome even if that out-
come is preferable to competing ones. Talking about rational preferences 
rather than rational choices may even be more perspicuous since what one 
prefers is in some sense more fundamental than what one chooses—an 
agent’s choices are practically rational only if they line up with the agent’s 
preferences. In any case, this paper operates under the assumption that ra-
tional preferences and rational choice are aligned. If an agent’s preference 
for one outcome over another is rational, it is also rational for that agent to 
choose that outcome over the other (or would be rational for the agent to 
choose that outcome if the outcome were live), and vice versa.
Finally, for simplicity, we’ll assume that agents are in, and believe 
they are in, epistemically transparent situations with respect to value 
and outcomes. So, for instance, Blaise knows that the deity can and will 
carry through with the promise should Blaise decide to accept the offer. 
If Blaise accepts the offer, the outcome in which he is transformed and 
unsurpassably happy will obtain. If Blaise declines the offer, the outcome 
in which he is untransformed will obtain. Furthermore, Blaise also knows 
that transformed, unsurpassably happy future Blaise experiences more 
value than untransformed future Blaise. Something similar holds for other 
agents in the other cases we’ll consider.
Now that these preliminaries are out of the way, let’s move on to the 
question of whether, from the standpoint of self-interest, it is rational for 
Blaise, or any other agent, to prefer to undergo radical change based on 
the Pascalian model.
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§ 1 Self-transformation and Practical Identity
1.1 Transformation
Agents sometimes face decisions in which at least one of the potential 
outcomes involves radical change. Blaise, from our story above, is not 
alone in facing this type of decision. Potential parents are in a similar situ-
ation according to Paul.5 Becoming a parent is radically transformative, 
and part of what makes the transition to parenthood so radical is that 
it involves what Paul calls personal transformation—the potential parent’s 
core preferences, life goals, and even the way she perceives the world 
change.6 These preference changes aren’t merely superficial ones, such as 
the casual moviegoer’s shift in preference from romantic comedies to epic 
dramas. They occur at a deeper level, like how the self-absorbed potential 
parent who detests children may find herself dedicating the rest of her life 
to her child’s welfare. When personal transformation occurs, the prefer-
ence changes that occur are deep, as are the changes to life goals and the 
way one sees the world. They are similar to Kuhnian paradigm shifts—the 
point of view of the personally transformed self can’t be understood by 
the pre-transformed self in a first-personal way because the pre-trans-
formed self lacks the framework with which to understand the future self. 
Because the potential parent would undergo such radical change to the 
fundamental ways she interacts with the world, the potential parent may 
not be able to project future parenthood as part of her life.7
At best, attempting to imagine a future of parenthood would be more 
like imagining what it would be like for one’s current self to be a parent 
as opposed to imagining what it’s like from the perspective of the future 
5For more on the transformative nature of becoming a parent, see Paul, “What You Can’t 
Expect When You’re Expecting” and Transformative Experience. Other examples abound. In 
fiction, we encounter characters confronted with decisions such as whether to become vam-
pires or pass on into the afterlife; they wrestle with these decisions without the benefit of 
knowing exactly how they will transform (though the changes are highly likely to be person-
ally transformative) and what that future will be like for them. Real life also contains decisions 
that philosophers allege involve transformative experiences: committing to marriage (Paul, 
Transformative Experience), gaining a new sense modality (Paul, Transformative Experience and 
Harman, “Transformative Experience and Reliance on Moral Testimony”), undergoing a 
gender transition (McKinnon, “Trans*formative Experience”), becoming a member of a dif-
ferent social group (Barnes, “Social Identities and Transformative Experiences”), undergoing 
religious conversion or apostasy (Chan, “Religious Experience, Voluntarist Reasons, and the 
Transformative Experience Puzzle”), and making a life-changing choice (Chang, “Transfor-
mative Choices”). 
6According to Paul (“What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting”), transformative 
experiences have two components: epistemic transformation and personal transformation. 
Epistemic transformation is the discovery of what the experience is like. In this paper, I’m 
concerned only with the personally transformative component. 
7To be clear, on Paul’s account agents cannot even project what it will be like to be trans-
formed. If Paul is right, then an agent won’t be able to imagine herself as a future parent since 
she can’t imagine what it would be like at all. This paper is neutral on whether agents can 
project what futures in which they radically transform will be like. But even in the scenario 
where they are, the problem the paper is addressing arises. 
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self. In more recent work, Paul8 suggests that there are at least two ways 
to empathize with our future selves. Affective empathy involves projecting 
our current selves into potential future scenarios. This type of empathy is 
akin to what we do when we empathize with others. Cognitive empathy 
is richer, and involves experiencing the potential future from the perspec-
tive of the future, rather than current, self. But this type of empathy can 
take place only when the future self is closely related to the current self. 
The distinction between these two types of empathies roughly tracks a 
distinction that Velleman9 draws between what it is like to visualize what 
Napoleon saw when looking out at Austerlitz and imagining that one is 
Napoleon looking out at Austerlitz. The latter removes all first-personal 
traces of the imaginer. Significantly for both Paul and Velleman, we, as 
our current selves, can’t imagine being a future self who has undergone 
personal transformation from the perspective of the future self. The per-
spective of the future self is inaccessible because it is not, in a literal way, 
the present self’s own.
Because the potential future self is literally changed beyond recogni-
tion from the perspective of the present self, I’ll use self-transformation to 
refer to these radical changes. In light of what’s been said, we’re now in a 
position to take a first pass at characterizing self-transformation. An agent 
undergoes self-transformation from t to t′ when and only when the self at 
t cannot “first-personally” identify with the self at t′. This is just a rough 
characterization we’ll refine later, and the first-personal identification con-
dition is meant to capture the inability of the self at t to project the life at t′ 
as their own. Thinking of the lack of first-personal identification in terms 
of a paradigm shift, a lack of cognitive empathy, or Velleman’s sense of 
inaccessibility are all compatible with this characterization. Changes that 
are radical enough to cause these phenomena are changes that involve 
self-transformation.
1.2 Practical Identity and Self-transformation
As radical as changes like parenthood are, these changes are not typically 
taken to be changes that call into question the continuity of personal 
identity. There are no extreme physical changes such as body swapping, 
brain transplants, fission, or teletransportation. Though the agent’s psy-
chology may change with respect to preferences and worldview, there’s 
no memory loss or gappy consciousness. Souls haven’t been invoked. 
Even features one might take to be metaphysically essential to the agent’s 
kind, such as rationality, persist throughout the change. This is the case 
even if one holds a view of essences on which essential features define 
what that agent’s kind is or a view of essences on which essential features 
are ones that the kind must have in order to exist. Metaphysically speaking, 
8See Paul, “The Subjectively Enduring Self.”
9See Velleman, “Self to Self.”
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the changes in question aren’t existential ones—they don’t threaten the 
existence of the person, metaphysically speaking.
But practically speaking, these changes are existentially threatening. 
Consider Parfit’s young Russian socialist who happens to be the descen-
dant of aristocrats and stands to inherit a fortune. He realizes that he is 
likely to lose his socialist ideals when he becomes wealthy. As he considers 
what his future self sans socialist ideals will be like, he realizes that he 
doesn’t identify with that future self at all. His instructions to his wife—“if 
I lose the ideals, I want you to think that I cease to exist”10—are telling.11 
Like Paul’s potential parent, the young Russian cannot project future aris-
tocracy as part of his life. The socialist ideals aren’t merely something he 
believes; they mediate the way in which he fundamentally understands 
the world and his role in it. Thus, he can’t empathize at all with a future 
self who lacks these ideals that shape his present self. That future self is so 
foreign to him that it may as well be a completely distinct person.
Agents are shaped by their preferences, life goals, approaches to deci-
sionmaking, and way they see the world, amongst other things. We can 
imagine an agent who has all of the features that shape their agential life 
wiped clean by a mad scientist and then replaced with contrary features. 
For instance, imagine that a mad scientist has taken Parfit’s young Russian 
and wiped away his socialist ideals, love for his wife, drive to further the 
welfare of those around him, and other features that shape his agential 
life. These features are then replaced with selfishness, aristocratic indiffer-
ence towards those around him, and the like. In this scenario, the agential 
life of the young Russian has ceased to exist, though perhaps the young 
Russian continues to exist metaphysically.
This distinction between metaphysical persons and practical agents 
is a significant but often underappreciated one. Perhaps the most well-
known articulation of this view comes from Parfit.12 According to Parfit, 
facts about personal identity (in the metaphysical sense) are sometimes 
opaque to us. In hard cases such as fission, we don’t know which of the 
resulting people, if any, are identical to the pre-fission person. Perhaps 
there isn’t even a fact of the matter regarding whether personal identity 
holds between the pre-fission person and the post-fission people. How-
ever, personal identity also doesn’t matter. What does matter are the facts 
about the practical agents, and those are more readily available to us 
than facts about personal identity. Schechtman13 has advanced a similar 
distinction between the metaphysical and the practical. For her, there are 
metaphysical questions about what persons are and practical questions 
10Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 327.
11Parfit primarily uses this case to consider what one ought to do when future preferences 
conflict with present ones. But it also nicely illustrates the alienation that can occur when an 
agent undergoes radical changes and loses features that he or she regards as essential. 
12See Parfit, Reasons and Persons.
13See Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves. 
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about who they are. Questions about the former often center upon the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. But questions about 
the latter focus on what characteristics are “truly those of the person.”14 
These are the characteristics that most centrally make and express who 
a person is. So, for instance, having socialist ideals is a characteristic that 
centrally makes and expresses who the young Russian is, though it is not 
metaphysically essential. Having these ideals is an essential feature of who 
the young Russian is, but not what he is.
I hope that what I’ve said here is enough to make the reader sympathetic 
to the distinction between what a person is metaphysically speaking and 
who an agent is practically speaking. Obviously there is much more that 
can be said, but I won’t offer a fully worked out metaphysics of practical 
agents here. Instead, I’ll ask the reader to reflect upon the features that 
are central to who they are as practical agents. Perhaps unlike the young 
Russian and his socialist ideals, there is no single feature that can be iden-
tified. But if one continues to strip away features, there will be a point at 
which losing the sum of those features destroys the practical agent. Those 
feature(s) are practically essential. They define who the agent is practically 
speaking, and the agent, at least as conceived of practically, cannot survive 
the loss of them.15 With this notion of who an agent is practically speaking 
in mind, let us revisit our initial characterization of self-transformation 
and precisify it into a definition:
Self-transformation is the change undergone by an agent, S, between 
times t and t′ when and only when S at t′ lacks some feature (or cluster 
of features) that S at t regards as practically essential.
Losing these features is sufficient for the S at t failing to first-personally 
identify with S at t′.16
14Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, 73.
15Practically essential features are to practical agents as metaphysically essential proper-
ties are to metaphysical persons. For our purposes, it doesn’t matter whether essentialness is 
analyzed modally (roughly, a property F is essential to X iff if X exists, X is F) or definitionally 
(roughly, a property F is essential to X iff F is part of X’s real definition). On either analysis, 
an agent’s losing a practically essential feature (like the young Russian losing his socialist 
ideals) is sufficient for the agent ceasing to exist, practically speaking. That’s enough to get 
the rest of the paper going.
 How a person’s practically essential features and metaphysically essential properties 
relate to each other is another interesting question that I won’t attempt to answer for the 
purposes of this paper. Perhaps there is no connection between them. Alternatively, perhaps 
all of the necessary properties of a (metaphysical person) are also necessary properties of the 
associated practical agent. This is easiest to see when essentialness is analyzed modally: if 
practically essential features are analyzed modally (so F is practically essential to X iff if X 
(practically) exists, X is F), all of an agent’s necessary properties (including the non-practical 
ones) count as practically essential. In either case, what’s important for our purposes is that 
persons need both their metaphysically essential properties and practically essential features 
to exist practically. 
16Losing those features might also be necessary for S at t failing to first-personally identify 
with S at t,’ but I won’t argue for that since the sufficiency claim is all that’s needed for present 
purposes.
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A final feature of self-transformation deserves comment. The feature(s) 
S loses are ones that S at t regards as practically essential. S’s regarding the 
feature(s) as practically essential is important for three reasons. First, 
whether a particular feature—such as having socialist ideals—counts as 
practically essential varies from agent to agent. Socialist ideals are essen-
tial to Parfit’s young Russian, but it’s not hard to imagine a Bernie bro who 
holds socialist ideals, but non-essentially. Second, we’re in a context where 
an agent’s ability to first-personally identify with a future self is the factor 
that determines whether the changes the future self undergoes would 
involve self-transformation. This factor consists only of S being able to 
imagine what it would be like to lose that feature. If S can’t do that—in 
other words, if having that feature is essential to S’s sense of self—then 
losing that feature is transformative in the sense that we’re interested in.
Finally, one might worry that the definition I’ve offered eliminates the 
possibility of an agent’s being mistaken about their practically essential 
features. One way to alleviate the concern is to stipulate that the agents in 
all the cases discussed in this paper are not mistaken. But that’s not neces-
sary because what’s at issue in this paper is practical rationality. And what 
counts as practically rational depends, in large part, on the beliefs of an 
agent. Agents who prefer outcomes that they believe to be the worst pos-
sible outcomes for them are practically irrational even if it turns out that 
the outcome they prefer is better than competing ones. So suppose that 
there are practically essential features, but that agents can be mistaken 
about which of their features are practically essential. (In other words, 
substitute “is practically essential for S at t” for “S at t regards as practi-
cally essential.”) It’s still the case that what matters for evaluating whether 
agents are practically rational are going to be their beliefs about, or what 
they regard as, their practically essential features. Thus, even if agents can 
be mistaken, it is appropriate to focus upon the features agents take to be 
essential rather than ones that are essential in some objective sense.
Now that we’re equipped with an understanding of what self-transfor-
mation is, let’s turn to why they pose a difficulty for the Pascalian model.
§ 2 Trouble for the Pascalian Model?
Reasoning on the Pascalian model works well in ordinary cases. Take, 
for instance, the rather mundane decision I make each morning to drink 
coffee, tea, or neither for breakfast. If the state of affairs in which I drink 
coffee for breakfast is more valuable than the state in which I drink tea, 
then it’s in my self-interest to have coffee rather than tea. Furthermore, 
later in the day when I reflect back upon what I drank during breakfast, 
it makes sense for me to prefer that I drank coffee to some alternative 
given that the coffee state was in fact that best state. As far as practical 
rationality is concerned, it is rational for me to prefer coffee to tea, and 
to ultimately choose coffee rather than tea. Considerations of self-interest 
are what make the preference for coffee rational, and the Pascalian model 
works—both when the preference concerns the past and the future.
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But while the Pascalian model does well in ordinary cases, it doesn’t do 
well in cases where the agent would be radically different in the potential 
outcomes. The model breaks down (or so I’ll argue) when the decision 
point involves self-transformation. To motivate this position, I offer a pair 
of cases about preferences regarding the past. (I’ll extend what I say about 
these cases to the future in § 4.) The first is a variation on the non-identity 
problem:
Non-identity. Wilma wants to have a child. The doctor tells her that she 
can conceive now or take a pill and wait a month. If she waits, the child 
will have LeBron’s physical gifts, Parfit’s philosophical ingenuity, and 
Mother Theresa’s kindness. If she conceives now, the child will be av-
erage with respect to physical and philosophical abilities, as well as 
altruistic inclinations. Wilma conceives now, and Wilma’s child con-
siders whether it would be better for her had her mother waited.
Suppose that, as Kripke suggests,17 one could not have originated from 
the union of gametes other than the gametes from which one actually 
originated such that Wilma’s waiting a month would result in a meta-
physically different child being conceived. Even if we stipulate that the 
world would be better from an objective standpoint had Wilma waited 
to conceive and had a different child a month later, it would be irrational 
for Wilma’s child to wish, for self-interested reasons, that her mother 
had waited. After all, had her mother waited, she would not exist at all! 
As long as Wilma’s child positively values her life, it is rational from the 
standpoint of self-interest for her to prefer the world in which she exists 
to the one in which she does not.
This case demonstrates two things. First, it shows that self-interest 
links up with a particular kind of value. The overall value of the world, 
objectively considered, doesn’t matter for self-interest. The value in a 
particular agent experiencing value is not what matters for self-interest 
either. Wilma’s child can recognize that there’s value in the experiences of 
value for the extraordinarily gifted child that would have been born had 
Wilma’s mother waited, but that value is unconnected to what is in the 
self-interest of Wilma’s child.18 Rather it is the value for Wilma’s child, or 
what we’ve been calling self-interested value, that makes the child’s pref-
erence that her mother not wait to conceive rational.19 Self-interested value 
17Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 112–113.
18These first two types of value that are not self-interested value connect with the what 
are often labeled as agent-neutral and agent-relative, respectively (see, e.g., Thomas Nagel, 
The View from Nowhere, 152).
19Many other sorts of examples capture this point. For instance, from an objective stand-
point, it would be better overall for me to donate my organs to five patients who would 
otherwise die. Moreover, it may be that the value of those five patients getting to experience 
more value is significant—far more significant than the value of my continued experiences 
of value. Nonetheless, it would obviously not be in my self-interest to make this sacrifice.
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is the relevant type of value when considering what an agent is rationally 
required to prefer.20
Second, the case demonstrates that an agent’s existence in an out-
come is a necessary condition for the obtaining of that outcome being 
in that agent’s self-interest.21 This point is so obvious that it often goes 
unstated. But reflection upon how the Pascalian model and other deci-
sion procedures work reveals that they implicitly restrict the outcomes 
under consideration to ones in which the agent exists. The self matters 
in discussions about self-interest. If an agent does not exist in a potential 
outcome, that outcome obtaining is not going to be in the self-interest of 
that agent. So for instance, in the case of Wilma’s child, the child can set 
aside outcomes in which she does not exist, such as the one in which her 
mother waits to conceive.
However, metaphysical identity plus self-interested value fails to 
capture the entirety of what we care about when it comes to our rational 
preferences. Here’s a second case that’s aimed at showing that we also care 
about who we are, practically speaking:
Past Trauma. Jon suffered childhood trauma. He eventually overcame 
those experiences such that those experiences shape who Jon has be-
come. We can imagine an alternative past in which Jon’s early life went 
better and did not contain that trauma. Further, we can imagine that 
the better past does not detract from the value of the later stages of his 
life. Thus, non-traumatized Jon would have a life that contains more 
value in the past and overall, though he would also be a very different 
person from actual Jon. Jon now considers whether he prefers that his 
20In the transformative experience literature, there’s an additional wrinkle with respect 
to the value relevant for self-interest. According to Paul (Transformative Experience), the rele-
vant values must be assigned by an agent based on what the experience will be like for that 
agent. These assigned values are “subjective values.” In cases of self-transformation, present 
agents cannot assign subjective values to the experiences of the future transformed agent 
since the perspective of the future agent is inaccessible in virtue of the transformation that 
would occur. Crucially for Paul, this means that standard decision procedures can’t be used 
in cases of transformation since subjective values can’t be assigned to outcomes involving 
transformation.
 Paul’s story is controversial (see Pettigrew, “Transformative Experience and Decision 
Theory”; Krishnamurthy, “We Can Make Rational Decisions to Have a Child”; and Dough-
erty, Horowitz, and Sliwa, “Expecting the Unexpected”), but this paper can sidestep the 
issues subjective values present. Here’s why. Suppose that Paul is right that (i) agents cannot 
assign subjective values to futures involving personal transformation, and (ii) subjective 
values are what matter for standard decision theory. It then follows that standard decision 
theory—and thus the Pascalian model!—doesn’t apply to decisions involving transforma-
tion. (If the reader is inclined towards this view, they can simply skip to § 5.) But suppose 
that Paul is not right about subjective values and there are values relevant for self-interest. It 
may very well turn out (as I’ll argue) that even when these values are granted, the Pascalian 
model still doesn’t work when it comes to adopting the life of faith and decisions involving 
transformation. 
21Perhaps there are exceptional cases where it is in a person’s self-interest to cease existing 
if the only alternative to non-existence is a life that is not worth living. But this is not the 
situation any of our agents find themselves in, so for the purposes of this paper, we can set 
aside cases in which it would be better for the agent to not exist.
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early life had gone better even though it would result in an agent who 
is radically different from who he is.
Had the past gone differently, the resulting life would be better than the 
one that actually has unfolded. Non-traumatized Jon experiences a great 
deal of value—and it’s the type of value that’s relevant for non-traumatized 
Jon’s self-interest. Furthermore, unlike Wilma’s child and potential child, 
non-traumatized Jon is metaphysically related to Jon in the right way. If 
self-interested value and metaphysical identity are all that are considered, 
then it appears that Jon is rationally required to prefer, for self-interested 
reasons, the alternative past over his actual past.
Nevertheless, it does not seem that Jon is rationally required to prefer 
that the past had gone differently. It is not hard to imagine Jon reasoning 
as follows: it is true that had my early life gone better, the resulting life would 
be better overall than my own; however, that life would be radically different from 
mine, and I don’t want a life so alien from my own. There is something persua-
sive about this kind of reasoning, and if it’s rational, then it appears that 
something has gone wrong with the Pascalian model. On the Pascalian 
model, what is more valuable for an agent is in that agent’s self-interest 
and is the rational outcome for that agent to prefer. If that’s right, then 
an agent cannot simultaneously hold that one outcome is more valuable 
for them than another and rationally prefer the worse outcome. Here, we 
have a case where the past sans trauma is more valuable than the past 
with trauma for Jon overall. Nevertheless, Jon seemingly can rationally 
prefer the past with trauma. Thus, we have a case that appears to cause 
trouble for the Pascalian model.
§ 3 Diagnosis
In this section, I attempt to diagnose the mismatch between value and 
rational preference in Jon’s case, and explore the implications of that diag-
nosis for the Pascalian model. If we start with our observations from the 
case of Wilma’s child, it looks like there are two ways to diagnose Jon’s 
case. First, one might acknowledge that Jon’s reasoning is persuasive, but 
maintain that Jon nevertheless has an irrational preference and provide 
an error theory for why his reasoning appears so compelling. Second, 
one might claim that traumatized Jon is not (metaphysically) identical to 
non-traumatized Jon. Then, like Wilma’s child, it would be rational for 
non-traumatized Jon to prefer the outcome in which he is not trauma-
tized—though things may be going extremely well for non-traumatized 
Jon, traumatized Jon would not exist! I’ll explain why both of these diag-
noses are problematic before offering my own diagnosis that makes use of 
self-transformation and practical identity.
3.1 Diagnosis 1: Jon is Irrational
The first diagnosis, that Jon is irrational despite the intuitive appeal of 
his reasoning, is unsatisfactory. It’s just deeply implausible that we are 
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required to prefer lives that are completely foreign to our own merely 
because the people who have those lives experience more value than we 
do and happen to be metaphysically related to us. When we consider al-
ternative ways our lives could go, we want the people in those alternatives 
to be people with whom we can identify. If their lives are too different 
from our own, they don’t seem to be related to us in the right way even if 
the metaphysical situation is clear.
This position is not idiosyncratic. In fact, many philosophers take as a 
starting point the fact that from the standpoint of self-interest, agents can 
prefer their own lives to alternatives that are more valuable but foreign. 
For instance, in the context of considering the problem of evil, Adams22 
considers whether it is one’s self-interest to have lived an alternative life 
that is absent of evil if that life would be very different from one’s actual 
life. His paradigm case is the life of Helen Keller:
Let us suppose that she would have had an even better and happier life if 
her sight and hearing had been spared (though that is not obviously true). 
But whatever its excellences, that life would not have had one day in it that 
would have been very like any day of her actual life after the age of nineteen 
months. Her actual life—in its emotional as well as its sensory qualities, in 
its skills and projects, and doubtless in much of her personality and char-
acter—was built around the fact of her blindness and deafness. That other, 
happier life would have contained few of the particular joys and sorrows, 
trials and triumphs—in short very little of the concrete content—that she 
cared about in her actual life. Her never having been blind or deaf would 
have been very like her never having existed. Why should she wish for that, 
given that she had reason to be glad she existed?23
For Adams, Keller’s case shows that the link between value and rational 
preference can be severed. Thus, it can still be rational for Keller to prefer her 
own life to the alternative one since rational preference follows self-interest 
rather than value. Furthermore, Keller’s case is analogous to Jon’s. In both 
cases, it is rational for agents, from the standpoint of self-interest, to prefer 
their own lives to radically different alternatives even if those alternatives 
are better.
Other philosophers share Adams’s view that agents can rationally 
prefer their own past lives to extremely different but more valuable 
ones—though they of course differ on why this is the case.24 For instance, 
Harman offers an account on which we can prefer our own past to alter-
native ones even if it is less valuable because of our preferences for loved 
22Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil.”
23Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil,” 73.
24For instance, the explanation for preferring the actual past Adams offers involves sug-
gesting that there may only be partial identity between actual Helen Keller and the Helen 
Keller in the alternative that does not involve blindness and deafness. Harman, on the other 
hand, defends the past preference by arguing that there is an asymmetry between past and 
future desires. Those who hold “conservatism” will concur with Adams and Harman with 
respect to their judgment about Jon’s case, but say that Jon’s preference is rational because 
rationality requires a preference for the actual. 
16 Faith and Philosophy
ones.25 (Extending this thought to self-love also explains why Jon’s pref-
erence appears rational; as long as Jon loves the person he has become, 
he’s reasonable in preferring his own life to that of non-traumatized Jon’s.) 
For our purposes, it’s significant that the point of agreement is that agents 
like Jon are rational when they prefer that the past went the way it did 
over an alternative, but radically different possibility. And this agreement, 
I suggest, counts heavily against this diagnosis.
3.2 Diagnosis 2: Metaphysical Non-identity
On the second diagnosis, Jon is not metaphysically identical to non-trauma-
tized Jon. There are at least two reasons to resist this diagnosis. First, there 
is little independent motivation for claiming that claim that traumatized 
Jon is not, metaphysically speaking, the same person as non-traumatized 
Jon. In addition to lacking independent motivation, committing to the 
non-identity of persons in divergent futures introduces a host of addi-
tional undesirable metaphysical commitments. For instance, one would 
have to deny that there are other ways our lives could have gone and 
hold that seemingly contingent properties are necessary.26 Without good 
independent motivation, this diagnosis is implausible.
But second, even if this diagnosis is correct, it overgeneralizes too much. 
Intuitively, we could have been different. And when we imagine the ways 
in which we could have been different, the difference arises from situa-
tions like the past going a different way. If agents in divergent potential 
outcomes are not identical, then when it comes to an agent looking back at 
ways the past might have gone differently, it is never the case that things 
could have gone better for that agent. Over-caffeinated agents should be 
able to look back at their past decision and prefer that they had not con-
sumed one cup too many. But they cannot do so if the alternative outcome 
in which an extremely similar agent who shares their history does not 
actually contain an agent who is metaphysically identical to them. Note 
that this second diagnosis does not merely amount to a preference for the 
actual, which is in itself a dubious result for practical rationality (and one 
25While discussing the merits of “I’ll be glad I did it” reasoning, Harman considers cases 
in which adults are glad that their lives turned out the way that they did even though alter-
native lives would have been more valuable to the person living those lives. For instance, 
a teenage mother can rationally prefer not having waited to have a child later in life and a 
deaf adult can rationally prefer not having received a cochlear implant as a child even if it is 
stipulated in both cases that the alternative pasts would have been more valuable. Harman 
explains that this is because “[i]t can be reasonable to prefer that someone one loves has 
come to be the person she is, even if one recognizes that there is an alternative in which 
things would have been better, in every way of being better which one should care about. It 
can be reasonable to prefer that someone one loves has come to exist” (Harman, “‘I’ll Be Glad 
I Did It’ Reasoning,” 186).
26It would be odd if pre-traumatized Jon stood in the personal identity relation to both 
traumatized Jon and non-traumatized Jon, but that traumatized Jon and non-traumatized 
Jon did not stand in that relation to each other. I’m not saying that it’s impossible to tell a 
story that explains this oddness, but that story does have the consequence that traumatized 
Jon’s life could not have gone otherwise! Properties, such as being traumatized, that we 
might have thought were contingent are actually necessary. 
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that is incompatible with preferring that your over-caffeinated self had 
not consumed that last cup of coffee). It requires accepting an extremely 
unsavory metaphysical consequence—we can only exist in the exact out-
comes that played out. There is no sense in which things could have gone 
differently for us.
I suspect that this diagnosis is antecedently unattractive to most philos-
ophers. But let me briefly highlight something in case the reader does find 
this diagnosis appealing. Should it turn out that Jon and non-traumatized 
Jon are not metaphysically identical, then Jon’s case is analogous to that 
of Wilma’s child. It then turns out that it is in Jon’s self-interest to have 
experienced the childhood trauma and that he is rational in preferring 
that past to the non-traumatic alternative. As we’ll see when we turn to 
Blaise and cases involving future change, this diagnosis also spells trouble 
for the Pascalian model.
3.3 Diagnosis 3: Practical Non-identity
Let’s take stock of the ground we’ve covered. In rejecting the first two 
diagnoses, the following two commitments were affirmed:
(i) It is rational, from the standpoint of self-interest, for Jon to prefer 
his own life to that of non-traumatized Jon even if non-traumatized 
Jon experiences more value (of the kind relevant to self-interest) 
than Jon does.
(ii) Jon is identical (metaphysically speaking) to non-traumatized Jon.
Accepting these two commitments means that knowing all the facts about 
self-interested value as well as all the metaphysical facts in some out-
comes is not always enough to determine which of those two outcomes 
the agent ought to rationally prefer. This is enough to cause a problem for 
the Pascalian model since considerations of self-interest are supposed to 
be sufficient for determining rational preference. But we’ve now seen that 
in cases like Jon’s involving past decision points where an alternative out-
come involves a radically different life, the links between self-interested 
value and rational preference appear not to hold. This means that agents 
like Jon, who are fully aware of all of the relevant value facts, cannot move 
from self-interested value to rational preference in the way the Pascalian 
model suggests that they can.
Thus far, I’ve argued against two diagnoses that would preserve the 
Pascalian model as typically understood. I now want to offer my own 
diagnosis, which can be taken as either a rejection of or modification to 
the Pascalian model. Notice that Jon’s reasoning is persuasive because 
Past trauma is similar to Non-identity. In both cases, an agent compares 
two scenarios, one that involves who they are, and one that involves an 
alternative scenario with a radically different agent. In Non-identity, the 
agents in the two outcomes are not metaphysically related to each other. 
In Past trauma, the two agents are metaphysically related, but there’s been 
significant divergence involving loss of features with which Jon strongly 
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identifies. The way in which he overcame his past trauma has been in-
corporated into how he identifies as an agent, and constitutes who he is. 
When he considers the alternative non-traumatized life, he can’t identify 
with that alternative agent because that agent’s life is so different from 
his own. As far as Jon’s practical reasoning is concerned, that agent may 
as well be someone else—it is as if they are not metaphysically identical. 
Non-traumatized Jon is not practically identical to Jon.
Non-traumatized Jon lacks features that Jon takes to be practically 
essential to himself, so Jon cannot identify with non-traumatized Jon. In 
Paul’s language, Jon would have to undergo a transformative experience 
to become non-traumatized Jon. Jon cannot project what it would be like 
to be non-traumatized Jon or affectively empathize with non-traumatized 
Jon in the way that is required to form preferences about the alternative in 
which he does not experience childhood trauma. In Velleman’s language, 
Jon cannot imagine what it would be like for him to be non-traumatized 
Jon in the same way that we cannot imagine what it would be like for us to 
be Napoleon looking out at Austerlitz. Because the alternative is not one 
involving an agent with whom Jon identifies, the value experienced by 
the agent in that alternative is irrelevant to Jon when Jon considers things 
from the standpoint of self-interest.
Here’s my diagnosis. In mundane cases, knowing all the facts about how 
valuable outcomes are for agents and whether those agents metaphysi-
cally exist in those situations are sufficient for determining which outcome 
an agent ought to rationally prefer from the standpoint of self-interest. 
This is because the outcomes involving the same metaphysical agent and 
outcomes involving the same practical agent are coextensive in mundane 
cases. But in cases involving self-transformation, such as Jon’s, those two 
types of facts aren’t sufficient for determining which outcome the agent 
ought to prefer because metaphysical and practical identity come apart. 
Agents must also identify in a practical sense with the agents in the out-
comes. The ‘self’ of self-interest is often taken for granted when people use 
standard decision procedures, such as the Pascalian model. To the extent 
that it’s considered, such as in non-identity cases, metaphysical identity 
is the default. What I’m suggesting is that if we don’t want to reject the 
Pascalian model outright in light of cases like Jon’s, it needs to be modified 
such that the self in ‘self-interest’ is the practical self. Then, Jon’s prefer-
ence for his actual past is a preference for the past involving the most 
self-interested value since the value associated with the alternative past is 
no longer the type of value relevant to (practical) self-interest. Optimisti-
cally for the Pascalian model, the value, metaphysical, and practical facts 
about the agent in all the outcomes are sufficient for determining which 
outcome agents are rationally required to prefer from the standpoint of 
self-interest.
Here’s where this diagnosis leaves us. In cases involving self-transfor-
mation in the past, rational preferences depend upon self-interested value 
and practical (and metaphysical) identity. In § 4, I’ll argue that the same 
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holds for decisions involving future self-transformation. In § 5, I’ll discuss 
the implications of this view for the practical rationality of faith.
§ 4 Future-oriented Preferences
Thus far, I’ve argued that in cases involving past self-transformation, the 
Pascalian model needs to understand the self of self-interest in terms of 
practical identity. The same, I now argue, holds for preferences about fu-
ture outcomes involving self-transformation. The argument is simple:
(P1) An agent’s rational preference about past alternatives depends on 
(i) the value for agents in those alternatives, and (ii) the practical 
(and metaphysical) identity of agents in those alternatives being 
that of the agent deliberating about their preferences regarding 
the past.27
(P2) What the rationality of a preference depends on is insensitive to 
whether the preference is about the agent’s past, present, or future.
(C) An agent’s rational preference about future alternatives depends 
on (i) the value for agents in those alternatives, and (ii) the practi-
cal (and metaphysical) identity of agents in those alternatives be-
ing that of the agent deliberating about their preferences regard-
ing the future.
I defended (P1) in the previous section. This section is dedicated to de-
fending (P2).
Prima facie, it seems that whatever the rationality of past preferences 
depends upon is what present and future preferences also depend upon. 
(P2) is a reasonable default position. It’s even plausible to interpret the 
Pascalian model as holding this position as well—an agent’s rational 
preferences are linked to self-interested value for that agent, regardless of 
whether that preference is about the past, present, or the future. Further-
more, there are a variety of arguments defending treating past, present, 
and future preferences similarly. For instance, the Epicureans thought that 
differences based on whether the preference is about the past, present, or 
future, are arbitrary ones that rationality ignores.28 Sullivan and Greene 
27Alternatively, if the reader prefers to reject the Pascalian model rather than adopt the 
modification involving practical identity, the reader can use something like (P1*):
(P1*) It’s not the case that the Pascalian model determines a self-interested agent’s 
rational preference about past alternatives in cases of self-transformation.
(P2) remains the same, and combined with (P1*) yields the alternative (C*):
(C*) It’s not the case that the Pascalian model determines a self-interested agent’s 
rational preference about future alternatives in cases of self-transformation.
28On the Epicurean view, self-interest is a matter of pleasure—the self-interested agent 
ought to maximize the amount of pleasure in his or her life. We can think of the amount of 
pleasure an agent experiences during any given event as the subjective value that event has 
for the agent. What the Epicureans realized was that tradeoffs in pleasure often have to be 
made between near- and distant-future events, and that one’s life ends up having more total 
value when near- and distant-future events are weighted equally.
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defend this line by pointing out that when agents treat past preferences 
differently by discounting them, agents can be Dutch-booked, which 
demonstrates that their preferences are inconsistent, and thus irrational.29
However, (P2) is not completely unassailable. There are some asymme-
tries between the past and the future. Perhaps one of these asymmetries 
affects (P2). I’ll briefly consider two such asymmetries and the objections 
to which they give rise. First, one might hold that the past is impor-
tantly different from the future because while the past is fixed (at least 
with respect to its intrinsic features), the future is open.30 Because of this 
asymmetry, agents can’t choose an alternative past while they can choose 
amongst alternative futures. More problematically—or so the objection 
goes—agents can’t form preferences about alternatives (such as past ones) 
that they cannot actually choose. But as we saw earlier, the claim that we 
cannot form preferences and make choices with respect to the past in light 
of its fixedness is dubious. Though the asymmetry with respect to fixed-
ness might affect which options are live—Jon can’t do anything to change 
his past but has options with respect to the future—it does not affect the 
ability to form rational preferences. Thus, even if there is this asymmetry 
between the past and the future, it does not affect an agent’s ability to form 
preferences about the past.
Second, one might object to (P2) because of a causal asymmetry be-
tween past and future states of affairs. Past states cause future states, but 
not vice versa. Part of why one might be inclined to believe that Jon can 
prefer his actual past is that the actual past (or something similar that 
would include the trauma) is causally necessary for his becoming who 
he is. Jon, who is happy with who he has become, cannot prefer a signifi-
cantly different past because that would entail radically changing who he 
has become. However, what happens in the future has no causal effect on 
who he is now. Thus, the objection goes, one can prefer a past with less 
value than an alternative if it leads to the present that is preferred.31 But 
preferring a future outcome with less value than an alternative cannot be 
defended on the same grounds since the future outcome does not causally 
affect the present.32
29Sullivan and Greene are responding to Parfit. Parfit presents thought experiments that 
purportedly show that it is rational for agents to prefer that unpleasant events be in their past 
rather than their future. Sullivan and Greene point out that assigning any kind of discount 
function to the past, one becomes vulnerable to Dutch-booking. Because Dutch books occur 
when there are inconsistent value and probability assignments, avoiding Dutch books is 
often taken to be a necessary condition for rationality. See Greene and Sullivan, “Against 
Time Bias.”
30The metaphysics underlying this point is controversial, but this paper grants it for the 
sake of argument. 
31One can also think of the preference for the actual and its associated value as a type 
of conservatism about value. For more discussion on (the implausibility) of this view, see 
Finocchiaro and Sullivan, “Yet Another ‘Epicurean’ Argument,” especially section 5.5.
32E.g., Harman, “‘I’ll Be Glad I Did it’ Reasoning.” On her view, the young parent and deaf 
adult can prefer their actual pasts because of the personal attachments they value. However, 
the teenager who is a merely potential young parent and the deaf child should not have the 
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In addressing this objection, it’s important to return to why Jon prefers 
his actual past involving the trauma to the one in which he does not expe-
rience the trauma. Jon doesn’t prefer his actual past merely because it is 
the only past that could result in who he is; he prefers it because he regards 
it as an integral part of who he is. His connection with that particular past 
is more than merely causal. His past constitutes who he is now, and has 
become a practically essential feature of who he is; it’s integrated into his 
practical identity. The causal and constitutive aren’t easily pulled apart, 
but carefully thinking about pairs of cases can help us better understand 
the distinction. Imagine twin-Jon, who is like Jon in every respect except 
for the way in which he identifies with his past. Jon’s past has informed 
the person he has become, and is integrated into the person into whom 
he has developed. While twin-Jon has followed the same path as Jon, he 
resents his traumatic past and wishes that it had not happened. Like Jon, 
twin-Jon likes the person he has become, would not necessarily prefer to 
be someone radically different, and realizes that his past has causally led 
to who he is. However, unlike Jon, twin-Jon resents his past. Twin-Jon does 
not regard his past as integrated into who he is. If there were a miracle 
world in which he developed into a similar person without the traumatic 
past—a world in which the causal connection is severed—twin-Jon would 
prefer that world to the actual one.33 But Jon would not because his past 
is a practically essential part of who he is. While twin-Jon prefers his own 
past to competing alternatives in virtue of only the causal connection, Jon 
prefers his past in virtue of it being constitutive of who he is.
This distinction reveals why the causal asymmetry objection appears 
convincing. If we have in mind preferences that are formed in virtue of 
the merely causal connection, then (P2) appears false since the causal 
connection does not apply to future states. However, if the preference is 
based in the past’s being constitutive or essential to who the agent is, then 
this objection doesn’t demonstrate the falsity of (P2). Instead, the objec-
tion would need to rely upon an asymmetry between the past and future 
when it comes to being a constitutive or essential part of who a person 
becomes. But once we shift to constitution rather than causation, it is not 
clear that there is an asymmetry between the past and the future. Instead, 
if a potential future lacks a feature that is practically essential to the agent, 
then it seems that the deliberating agent is rational in avoiding that future 
even if it is more valuable than one for which the agent ultimately opts. 
The agent does not exist in that future, practically speaking. So unlike 
causation, constitution does not appear to give rise to an asymmetry be-
corresponding future preferences that involve young parenthood and a lifetime of deafness 
because they have not yet formed the personal attachments that justify the backward-looking 
past preference. 
33For instance, on the Hudson view of hypertime, one can imagine Jon and twin-Jon com-
paring the actual world and a descendant of the actual world where God has removed the 
portion of the four-dimensional spacetime block containing the trauma (Hudson, The Fall 
and Hypertime). 
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cause it’s connected to the essential features of an agent’s practical identity. 
Indeed, considerations regarding these essential features of practical iden-
tity seem to give a very good reason for thinking that future preferences 
work similarly to past ones. Thus, the objection to (P2) fails.
If what I’ve argued for here is right, then rational preferences about the 
future take practical identity (as well as metaphysical identity and value) 
into account. We can now return to Blaise, who is considering whether to 
take up the deity on the offer to become the happiest man in the world. 
Taking the offer requires self-transformation, so Blaise is not identical, 
practically speaking, to the unsurpassably happy agent. Thus, Blaise is 
not rationally required to prefer that outcome even though it has an agent 
who experiences a great deal of value and is metaphysically related to 
Blaise. The same holds for the potential parent, young Russian, and any 
other agent facing future self-transformation. As with past preferences, if 
the Pascalian model is to work, it must take into account practical iden-
tity. But once it does, it looks like from the standpoint of self-interest, 
agents aren’t rationally required to prefer futures in which they undergo 
self-transformation.
§ 5 Faith as Transformative
5.1 The Transformative Nature of Faith
Agents who are considering adopting the life of the religiously faithful 
also face an outcome in which they undergo self-transformation. Faith is 
transformative, and there are many motivations for thinking that it fits 
the paradigm of self-transformation. The Apostle Paul, who undergoes 
a rather striking conversion, is in a very real sense a different person 
from Saul. To be sure, Saul doesn’t choose to convert; rather, conversion 
is thrust upon him via an unexpected religious experience. However, his 
conversion does demonstrate the transformation that occurs as a result 
of conversion. Saul’s core preferences and life goals radically change. 
Had they been cotemporaneous, his pre-transformation self would have 
persecuted his transformed self. The way he sees and experiences the 
world is wildly different as well: it is as if scales have fallen from his eyes. 
Though Saul did not choose to be transformed, we can easily imagine his 
earlier self being horrified at the thought of choosing that future. From 
the perspective of Paul pre-transformation, the value associated with the 
apostolic life is does not affect his self-interest since the apostolic future 
self may as well be a completely distinct person.
Paul’s case is extreme, but there are strong reasons for thinking that 
adopting the life of faith requires a similar degree of radical personal 
change. First, part of adopting this life traditionally involves submitting 
oneself to God’s will. This submission involves a deep change in core pref-
erences and life goals. For instance, from the Christian tradition, baptism 
symbolizes rebirth into a new life of faith. In the New Testament, Jesus 
tells a potential follower to “let the dead bury the dead” (Matthew 8:22). 
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Followers must be willing to radically change core aspects of their lives 
and concerns. Second, part of adopting the life of faith is hope for the 
afterlife. But the afterlife is almost certainly transformative. An eternity 
spent enjoying the beatific vision is like nothing else experienced in this 
world. As Sullivan34 points out, in light of how foreign that future would 
be, it is not obvious that one ought to prefer to go on. Adopting the life of 
faith is well within the paradigm of self-transformation.
As these examples suggest, faith—or at least the species of faith that I 
focus on—involves action.35 Namely, it involves adopting and then living 
the life of faith. One makes a lifelong commitment to continually act in a 
particular way. For instance, if a core commandment involves loving others 
as oneself, living faithfully requires continually striving to love others. 
(For the purposes of the paper, it doesn’t matter what specifically consti-
tutes the life, so long as it is sufficiently different from the life the agent 
would live without faith.) The lifelong nature of religious commitment is 
not unlike the commitment to a spouse; both demand living substantially 
different than one would otherwise, and carry on indefinitely with the in-
tent that they be irreversible. Carrying out this commitment is essentially 
action-based, so choosing to be transformed by faith falls squarely into 
the domain of practical rationality. Whether agents are rationally required 
to prefer and choose to adopt this life depends upon the considerations 
discussed above with respect to self-transformation.
Finally, it’s worth noting that it is compatible with what I’ve said that 
living the life of faith is a way of acquiring propositional faith (i.e., “faith 
that”). However, in keeping with Pascal and others, I’ll take for granted 
that one can live the life of faith independently of whether one has propo-
sitional faith.36 Recall that after giving the wager, Pascal considers whether 
agents have enough voluntary control over their beliefs to choose to adopt 
belief in God. He then suggests that agents can adopt a way of life that 
may eventually lead to belief.37 Regardless of whether Pascal’s suggestion 
34Though Sullivan ultimately thinks that one can rationally prefer to go on, she also ar-
gues that it’s not obvious that one should given how transformative the afterlife might be. See 
Sullivan, Time Bias, chap. 10 “Neutrality and Life Extension.”
35It’s widely accepted that there are multiple species of faith. Audi, for instance, proposes 
that there are at least seven distinct species of faith (“Faith, Belief, and Rationality”). The 
species I’m concerned with involves action. For contrast, there are also species that are 
propositional, or take the form of “faith that p” where p is some proposition. Those species 
are outside the scope of this paper, though I leave open the possibility that they might be 
expressed by actions. If they are, then perhaps what I say here also bears on other species of 
faith. 
36I admit that this is controversial since one might think that acting faithfully requires 
having epistemic faith in certain propositions. However, it seems entirely possible that one 
can mimic what it is to live the religious life, and that doing so will also require commitment 
that rises to the level of being transformative.
37Recall that in the Penseés, Pascal considers the person who might object as follows: “I am 
made so that I cannot believe. What then do you wish me to do?” Pascal advises that those 
who find themselves in this position should try “acting as if they already believed, taking 
holy water, having masses said, etc.”
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is an efficacious way of gaining propositional belief, it is clear that one can 
choose to commit to the life of faith independently of one’s propositional 
commitments. But should it turn out that acting as if one believes does 
lead to belief, that is yet another way in which faith is potentially trans-
formative.
Given these features of living the life of faith, one might wonder if faith 
is universally transformative. For instance, one might think that what I’ve 
said here doesn’t apply to a person who has already adopted the life of 
faith but is deliberating about whether to abandon it. If the person has 
already adopted that life, then living faithfully already figures into their 
practical identity, and continuing to remain committed to it wouldn’t 
involve self-transformation. Indeed, abandoning it might be the option 
that involves self-transformation if the agent’s faith has been essential to 
their self-identity. Though this is clearly not the type of agent Pascal had 
in mind, the case poses an interesting question about the universality of 
self-transformation in the case of faith. Similarly, an agent who is suffi-
ciently “easy-going” and doesn’t self-identify with any features might not 
risk losing any practically essential features by adopting a life of faith.38 
(If this is right, then it turns out that the Pascalian model might rationally 
require an agent to live the life of faith in this type of situation.)
I agree that based on what’s been said about self-transformation, it is 
possible that there are agents who would not regard adopting (or con-
tinuing) the life of faith as transformative. I leave it to the reader to decide 
for themselves how many people are in this situation. However, there 
are two things worth noting. First, what these cases demonstrate is that a 
person’s practically essential features factor into their evaluation of the po-
tential outcomes. This reinforces my central point that the Pascalian model 
must take practical identity into account. Second, there very well may be 
aspects of the life of faith, such as the beatific vision, that are universally 
transformative. Given that it involves changes we can’t comprehend and 
that we have at least some practically essential features, it seems possible 
that the changes might involve loss of those features. I’m not prepared to 
fully argue for this point, but it seems plausible. And even if there are not 
aspects of faith that are universally transformative, it does seem that for 
most people, adopting the life of faith would involve self-transformation.
5.2 Consequences for Faith
The transformative nature of faith, combined with the discussion in the 
previous sections, suggests that the Pascalian model of reasoning does not 
require deliberating agents to adopt a life of faith. This result has some 
interesting consequences. First, Pascal’s wager fails. On a Pascalian model 
that assumes that only metaphysical identity and value matter for self- 
interest, we run into the future version of Past trauma. Then just as Jon is 
not rationally required to prefer the alternative past involving an agent 
38Thanks to two anonymous referees for this point.
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with which he cannot identify, the potential faithful agent is not rationally 
required to prefer a future outcome involving a transformed agent with 
which the deliberating agent does not identify. On the revised Pascalian 
model that uses practical identity as what matters for self-interest, it turns 
out that the future agent who has been transformed by faith is not practi-
cally identical to the deliberating agent. Thus, the deliberating agent is not 
rationally required to prefer the future outcome involving the life of faith.
This consequence is significant, especially in light of how much of the 
literature surrounding the wager revolves around issues involving prob-
ability and infinite value.39 What my argument shows is that whether the 
wager can be formulated to avoid these problems is not what matters. 
Even if the math works out in favor of Pascal, we’ve seen that the fact that 
there is an outcome involving maximal value for the agent in that outcome 
does not entail that a deliberating agent is rationally required to prefer that 
outcome from the standpoint of self-interest. For if that outcome involves 
self-transformation, the deliberating agent may not be practically related 
to the transformed agent, and the self-interest relation won’t hold. Agents 
aren’t rationally required to take the wager since the infinite payout be-
longs to an agent that is not practically identical to them.
Second, my argument shows that the related “Anselm’s wager” does 
not rationally require agents to adopt the life of faith either. On Anselm’s 
wager, the deliberating agent knows that God exists and that the life of 
faith holds infinite value, so the element of risk present in Pascal’s wager is 
eliminated. The transparency of Anselm’s wager is even closer to Blaise’s 
situation than Pascal’s wager is; the agent simply chooses whether they 
want to adopt the life of faith. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of self-in-
terest, an agent facing this choice still isn’t rationally required to prefer the 
outcome with infinite value since, practically speaking, they are not the 
agent enjoying that value.
Third, my argument bears on contemporary attempts to justify the 
rationality of religious faith by appealing to value. Like Pascal’s wager, 
this work on the rationality of faith also relies on faith being practically 
rational. For instance, Buchak offers an analysis of faith on which “Act A is 
an act of faith that X, for S, if and only if: (i) S performing act A constitutes 
S taking a (subjective) risk on X, (ii) S chooses (to perform A before he 
examines additional evidence) rather than (to postpone his decision about 
A until he examines additional evidence), and (iii) S would follow through 
on performing A even if he were to receive counter-evidence.”40 Initially, 
it might appear that both (ii) and (iii) potentially require one to act con-
trary to what is practically rational. First with respect to (ii), it’s generally 
39Hájek, “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” and Monton, “Mixed Strategies Can’t Evade 
Pascal’s Wager,” for instance, argue about whether mixed strategies show that the wager 
does not work. Even more recently, Michael Rota (“A Better Version of Pascal’s Wager”) has 
argued that a better version of the wager can be formulated to avoid problems related to 
infinite utilities and the many-gods objection.
40Buchak, “Faith and Steadfastness,” 120.
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practically better for an agent to have more rather than less evidence when 
making a decision. Second, with respect to (iii), it seems that counter-evi-
dence can sometimes lower one’s credence in X enough to require one to 
refrain from acting on X.
However, it turns out that under certain conditions, it can actually be 
rational for an agent to have faith. First, it turns out that there are two 
scenarios in which the generalization about additional evidence does not 
apply—scenarios in which additional evidence is too costly to obtain and 
scenarios in which the agent will perform the same action regardless of 
the evidence.41 Plausibly, both of these scenarios are in play in the context 
of faith. Buchak suggests that postponing the decision and examining 
the evidence may involve too high a cost in some interpersonal contexts, 
including religious ones, since it risks damaging a relationship where 
faith in the other person matters. Also, condition (iii) suggests that the 
faithful agent would perform act A even in the face of counter-evidence. 
Second, commitment in the face of counter-evidence can be required to 
obtain a long-term good—without it, we might too hastily abandon proj-
ects when presented with misleading evidence. The value of the long-term 
good might then be weighty enough to make the risk of performing act A 
even in the face of counter-evidence practically rational. This is especially 
important in the contest of faith since faith takes place over a long time-
scale during which one might receive additional evidence even if one is 
attempting to not examine further.
While Buchak’s formulation is a general account of faith, it’s also ap-
plicable to religious faith. All that’s needed to apply it to religious faith is 
the relevant religious content and then an act that expresses that religious 
commitment, such as adopting the life of faith. Thus, if Buchak is correct, 
then she’s demonstrated that faith—both generally and in the religious 
case—can be justified by appealing to practical rationality. Now there’s 
a further question of whether the values in play in Buchak’s account are 
self-interested values. If they are, then her account is one that follows the 
Pascalian model, and, in light of what I’ve said above, agents are not ratio-
nally required to perform acts that express faith. However, if some of the 
values are not—perhaps because faith is objectively intrinsically valuable 
or has a moral dimension—then agents might still be rationally required 
to perform acts of faith. In any case, it’s significant that the model does not 
work if self-interested values are the only ones in play.
McKaughan42 also offers an account on which faith is practically ra-
tional. He distinguishes between different accounts of faith, and points out 
that on at least two models—models on which faith is either trust-based 
or hope-based—faith does not require belief in some proposition. If this 
is the case, then faith needs to be evaluated in accordance with non-epis-
41For more detailed discussion of when it is rational to forego additional evidence, see 
Buchak, “Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.”
42McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk.”
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temic, rather than epistemic, considerations. These considerations turn 
out to be practical ones. McKaughan’s suggestion is that though having 
trust- or hope-based faith involves risk, it can be rational to take on that 
risk if the potential benefits are high enough. The benefits or value of the 
outcomes for the agent is what grounds the rationality of faith. Thus, what 
I say above about Buchak’s overall account applies here as well.
In a later paper, McKaughan43 offers an action-centered account of faith 
that appeals to standard decision theory. Interestingly, the values in play 
in this account arise, in some sense, from the agent. Here, the agent en-
dows the outcome involving faith with more value by subjectively valuing 
it. Valuing this outcome is not itself required by practical rationality—so 
unlike Pascal, choosing the life of faith ends up being permissive rather 
than rationally required. However, once the agent places value on that 
outcome, the outcome becomes valuable, which then makes the agent’s 
preference for that outcome practically rational. I find this account in-
teresting because since it’s a permissive account, it’s compatible with my 
claim that self-interest alone can’t rationally require an agent to adopt the 
life of faith. But because faith is transformative, there’s still a question of 
whether the self in the outcome involving faith is practically identical to 
the self who places value on that outcome. If not, then it will still turn 
out that the expected value (if it is self-interested value) still may not be 
sufficient to make the agent’s choice rational even if the agent places value 
on the outcome involving faith.
Buchak and McKaughan are not alone in attempting to defend the ra-
tionality of faith by appealing to practical benefits. Audi44 also argues that 
some forms of faith do not require belief and that whether those forms 
of faith are rational does not turn on whether certain theistic beliefs are 
true or justified. The central theme in all of these defenses of faith has a 
Pascalian ring to it. Like Pascal’s wager, these contemporary defenses of 
faith appeal to the value an agent stands to gain if he or she adopts the life 
of faith. The working assumption is that the game is over once it’s estab-
lished that the outcome in which the agent has faith has more value for 
the agent than the outcome in which the agent lacks faith. However, if my 
argument above is correct, these defenses are not sufficient for showing 
that it is in an agent’s self-interest to have religious faith since it involves 
self-transformation. Though it is true that there is more value for the agent 
in the outcome that involves faith, the agent in that outcome may not be 
related to the deliberating agent in the correct way since faith is transfor-
mative. Thus, from the standpoint of self-interest, the deliberating agent is 
not rationally required to prefer adopting the life of faith.
43McKaughan, “Action-Centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality.”
44Audi, “Faith, Belief, and Rationality.”
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§ 6 Concluding Thoughts
I have argued that the Pascalian model of reasoning doesn’t work as 
expected in cases involving self-transformation. I then suggested that 
adopting a life of faith is a case of self-transformation, so, a fortiori, the 
Pascalian model doesn’t end up rationally requiring agents to adopt a life 
of faith even if that life involves infinite value for an agent. As a result, 
Pascal’s wager, and any other attempt to defend the practical rationality 
of faith solely in terms of self-interest is bound to fail. In the remainder of 
this paper, I want to consider three upshots of my view.
First, the points made above provide a new way of understanding the 
“wrong reasons” objection to Pascal’s wager. On the canonical under-
standing of this objection, taking the wager on the basis of self-interest is 
a wrong reason—it comes from an ignoble motivation. It’s been noted that 
this motivation is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it’s dubious 
that God would reward those who have wrong reasons with infinite value. 
If it turns out that God doesn’t reward those with wrong reasons, then 
that motivation for taking the wager is undercut. Second, one might be 
troubled by having the prospect of infinite value for oneself being the mo-
tivation for living the life of faith. Presumably, one of the most important 
parts of faith is seeking a personal relationship with God, and basing one’s 
faith solely on value misses this point. Doing so would be as disingenuous 
as marrying someone solely because they are rich. Ideally, one ought to 
be motivated to seek a relationship with another person because they care 
about that person, not because they care purely about their self-interest. 
Understood in this way, the wrong reasons objection highlights a sort of 
interpersonal moral failing that arises when value for oneself, rather than 
genuine care for God, grounds one’s faith.
On my account, making the decision because of the infinite payout as-
sociated with the outcome is not merely potentially undercutting or an 
interpersonal moral failing—it is also troubling from the standpoint of 
self-interest. After all, the agent enjoying that infinite value may not be re-
lated to the deliberating agent in the way relevant for self-interest! It turns 
out that value is a “wrong reason” in an additional sense: it is irrational 
for an agent to prefer an outcome on the basis of value if the agent also 
fails to consider whether they exist, practically speaking, in that outcome.
Second, my account has an interesting consequence for one response 
to the problem of divine hiddenness. One justification for hiddenness 
involves the need for distance between human agents and God so that 
human agents can freely decide whether they want to seek a relationship 
with God. On this response to hiddenness, God is irresistible. God is so 
irresistible that were God to be fully revealed, humans would be so over-
whelmed that they would not be able to turn away from a relationship. 
Because they would not be able to do otherwise, the preconditions for 
freely choosing would fail to be met.
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If I’m right, then it seems possible that human agents could resist and 
do so rationally. God could be fully revealed, and we would find ourselves 
in an Anselm’s wager situation. Nevertheless, because committing to the 
life of faith would involve self-transformation, the value experienced 
by the agent who transforms by committing to that life would not be a 
self-interested reason for the deliberating agent to commit. We would find 
ourselves in Blaise’s situation where it would be possible to reject the life 
of faith, and reject it rationally. Thus, this justification for God’s hidden-
ness fails.
Finally, given what I’ve said, one might wonder whether agents can 
rationally prefer to adopt the life of faith given that it involves self-trans-
formation. I’ve argued that in the scenario Pascal envisions, agents are not 
rationally required to adopt the life of faith. I’ve left open whether agents 
can rationally prefer that life at all. Perhaps they are rationally required 
not to prefer that life, or perhaps that preference is permissive (i.e., it is 
rationally permissible to prefer that life and rationally permissible not to 
have that preference). Both of these possibilities are interesting because 
they make room for a practical version of fideism. Fideism is typically an 
epistemic position on which, roughly, agents who have faith that P (where 
P is some proposition) believe P and are not rationally required to believe 
that P. On a more extreme version of fideism, belief that P is irrational, 
and on a less extreme version, belief that P is permissive. Practical fideism 
would then be the view that agents who have faith expressed by some 
preference (or corresponding choice) for a state of affairs S are not ratio-
nally required to prefer S. Again, on a more extreme version, preferring 
S is irrational, and on a less extreme version, preferring S is permissive.
I’ve also left open whether there are other factors that might require 
agents to adopt that life. The Pascalian model takes only self-interested 
value into account. But there might very well be other factors in play. Some 
of these potential factors, such as moral ones, go against the Pascalian spirit 
of trying to convince agents by appealing to self-interest. But my account 
leaves open the possibility that such factors might exist and affect what is 
practically rational for agents. Thus, it’s possible that practical rationality 
that factors in more than self-interest might require agents to adopt the 
life of faith. There also might be considerations other than self-interested 
value or moral ones that are connected to practical rationality. There isn’t 
room in this paper to fully pursue what these non-evaluative consider-
ations might be, but this possibility opens the door to some interesting 
candidates. For instance, in the literature on reasons, some have argued 
that voluntarist reasons (i.e., reasons arising from an act of will on the 
part of the agent) can provide the grounds of rational preference in some 
cases.45 These will-based reasons don’t reduce to self-interested value, and 
45For instance, Chang (“Grounding Practical Normativity”) and Korsgaard (The Sources 
of Normativity”) argue that acts of the will can generate reasons for action. These reasons 
aren’t based on self-interested value—value considerations are already taken into account 
as given reasons that weigh into agents’ deliberation. See also Chang, “Transformative 
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perhaps could make room for a different type of account of the practical 
rationality of faith.
Unfortunately, there isn’t room in this paper to fully pursue either 
of these possibilities. However, I’ve raised them to highlight where this 
paper leaves the discussion. These areas of future exploration are espe-
cially interesting because they also apply more broadly to other cases of 
self-transformation.
At the end of the passage in the Penseés containing his wager, Pascal 
imagines his interlocutor having a final reservation. His interlocutor has 
just learned that taking the wager is (purportedly) in his self-interest and 
is now reflecting on Pascal’s claim that that action (i.e., adopting the life 
of faith) can induce the belief required by the wager. The interlocutor, 
mulling over taking the prescribed action and the changes that action 
will bring about, finally says “but that is what I fear.” Pascal responds by 
asking “Why? What do you have to lose?” and goes on to enumerate the 
ways in which the interlocutor will change. Pascal concludes the passage 
by painting a picture of an interlocutor whose fears have been assuaged. I 
hope that the discussion in this paper reveals that the interlocutor’s fears 
are indeed apt and provides an overlooked response to accounts of faith 
that rely upon self-interest and the Pascalian model.46
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